000			02071nam a2200349 i 4500
001			71298
005			20260224104718.0
008			230719s2024 nyu b 001 0 eng
010			_a2023033278
020			_a9780190061593 _q(hardback)
020			_z9780190061623 _q(epub)
040			_aDLC _beng _cDLC _dBAUN _erda
041	0		_ager
043			_an-us---
049			_aBAUN_MERKEZ
050	0	0	_aKF4550 _b.L475 2024
082	0	0	_223/eng/20230802
100	1		_aLevinson, Daryl, _eaut
245	1	0	_aLaw for leviathan : _bconstitutional law, international law, and the state / _cDaryl Levinson.
264		1	_aNew York : _bOxford University Press, _c[2024]
300			_aviii, 301 pages ; _c24 cm.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 245-296) and index.
520			_a"An effective system of law must be able to authoritatively specify what the law is, and then get its subjects to follow it. Skeptics of international law have long questioned its ability to meet this standard, wondering, for instance, why a global superpower like the United States would bow to a rule of international law that disserved its interests, rather than changing, disregarding, or interpreting it away. We might equally wonder, however, why a President of the United States would choose to abide by constitutional limitations rather than dismiss them as "parchment barriers." While constitutionalists have paid less attention to these kinds of questions than their internationalist counterparts, the answers available to them are, not surprisingly, similar. This chapter describes how law for states can achieve some measure of settlement and compliance even in the absence of a crown-wearing, sword-wielding Leviathan standing above"--
650		0	_aConstitutional law _zUnited States. _920167
650		0	_aInternational law _zUnited States.
650		0	_aConstitutional law. _9619
650		0	_aState, The. _94293
942			_2lcc _cKT
999			_c105089 _d105089