000			03559nam a2200277 i 4500
008			001101s2001 njua b 001 0 eng
010			_a00053259
020			_a0765800438 _c(alk. paper)
040			_aDLC _cDLC _dOUN _dBAUN _dBAUN
049			_aBAUN_MERKEZ
050	0	4	_aBD232 _b.B68 2000
100	1		_aBoudon, Raymond
245	1	4	_aThe origin of values : _bsociology and philosophy of beliefs / _cRaymond Boudon
264		1	_aNew Brunswick, N.J. : _bTransaction Publishers, _c[2001]
264		4	_c©2001
300			_avii, 230 pages : _billustrations ; _c24 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 215-220) and index
505	0	0	_tTable Of Contents: _tIntroduction: Explaining Values and Valuation _tExplaining Values and Valuation: A Question That Has Inspired Many Theories _tThe Diversity and Empirical Inefficiency of Value Theories _tMunchhausen's Trilemma _tMunchhausen's Trilemma and Scientific Knowledge _tMunchhausen's Trilemma and the Explanation of Norms and Values _t``Fideist'' Theories _tSkeptical Theories _tRational Theories _tNormative and Positive Beliefs _tThe Trilemma and Moral Life _tRational Theories: Limits of the ``Rational Choice Model'' _tThe Attractiveness of Rational Choice Theory (RCT) _tWhether RCT is General _tAlternative Way _tTwo Examples from Tocqueville _t``Cognitive Rationality'' _tA Special Case of Utmost Relevance _tRCT: A Particular Case of a More General Model _tRelativistic vs. Naturalistic Theories: Their Interest and Limits _tThat Value Relativism is Widespread _tDo We Need to Accept These Views as Sociologists and as People? _tThe Naturalistic Reaction _tThe Reasons for Moral Convictions _tCommunitarianism Revisited _tA Seminal and Difficult Notion: ``Axiological Rationality'' _tWeber Often Ill-Understood _tThe Methodological Principles of Weber's Sociology _tWhy These Principles? _tMoral Feelings _t``Gesinnungsethik'' and ``Verantwortungsethik'' _tBack to Kant? _tGeneralizing the ``Rational Choice Model'' into a Cognitivist Model _tExplaining Collective Beliefs: The ``Cognitivist'' Model _tType 2 Beliefs: Examples from Cognitive Psychology _tType 3 Beliefs: Examples from the Sociology of Knowledge _tType 3 Beliefs: Examples from the Sociology of Norms and Values _tThe Need for a Non-Utilitarian Notion of Rationality _tThe Cognitivist Model Applied to the Analysis of the Feelings of Justice _tPhilosophy and Sociology on Axiological Feelings _tA Cognitivist Theory of Axiological Feelings _tSmith's Example _tLessons from Smith's Example _tApplication of the Model to Two Examples _tChecking the Importance of Contextual Effects _tWhich Criteria of Fairness, Legitimacy, Etc.? _tThe Universal and Contextual Dimensions of Axiological Feelings and Justice Feelings in Particular _tContextual Variations of Tolerance to Inequalities _tBeyond Kantian, Utilitarian, and Contractualist Theories _tThe Cognitivist Model Applied to the Analysis of Public Opinion _tA Free Interpretation of the Metaphor of the ``Impartial Spectator'' _tEffects of Social Affiliations: Special Interests, Group Interests, and Role Interests _tEffects of Community Affiliations _tEffects of Position _tOrganizations and People _tCognitive Effects _tAxiological Effects _tScheler Effects _tCombined Effects _tTocqueville-Kuran Effects _tThe Influence of the Impartial Spectator _tPublic Opinion and the Rationalization of Social Life _tReferences _tIndex
650		0	_aValues
900			_a25873
900			_bsatın
942			_2lcc _cKT
999			_c21345 _d21345