000 04774nam a2200361 i 4500
005 20250728143944.0
008 020723s2002 nyum b a001 0 eng
010 _a2002618019
020 _a0471150401
020 _a9780471150404
040 _aUKM
_beng
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041 0 _aeng
042 _alccopycat
049 _aBAUN_MERKEZ
050 0 0 _aHD9685.A2
_bS75 2002
050 0 0 _aHD9685.A2
_bS75 2002
100 1 _aStoft, Steven
_eaut
_9121809
245 1 0 _aPower system economics :
_bdesigning markets for electricity /
_cSteven Stoft.
264 1 _aPiscataway, NJ :
_bIEEE Press ;
_aNew York :
_bWiley-Interscience,
_c2002.
300 _axxiv, 468 pages :
_billustrations ;
_c24 cm.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _aunmediated
_bn
_2rdamedia
338 _avolume
_bnc
_2rdacarrier
500 _a"An introduction to the fundamental economics of power market design and analysis"--Back cover.
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages [455]-459) and index.
505 0 0 _tList of Results and Fallacies
_t-- Preface
_t-- Acronyms and Abbreviations
_t-- Symbols
_t-- Part 1: Power Market Fundamentals
_t-- Prologue
_t-- Why Deregulate? What to Deregulate
_t-- Pricing Power, Energy, and Capacity
_t-- Power Supply and Demand
_t-- What Is Competition? Marginal Cost in a Power Market
_t-- Market Structure
_t-- Market Architecture
_t-- Designing and Testing Market Rules
_t-- Part 2: Reliability, Price Spikes and Investment
_t-- Reliability and Investment Policy
_t-- Price Spikes Recover Fixed Costs
_t-- Reliability and Generation
_t-- Limiting the Price Spikes
_t-- Value-of-Lost-Load Pricing
_t-- Operating-Reserve Pricing
_t-- Market Dynamics and the Profit Function
_t-- Requirements for Installed Capacity
_t-- Inter-System Competition for Reliability
_t-- Unsolved Problems
_t-- Part 3: Market Architecture
_t-- Introduction
_t-- The Two-Settlement System
_t-- Day-Ahead Market Designs
_t-- Ancillary Services
_t-- The Day-Ahead Market in Theory
_t-- The Real-Time Market in Theory
_t-- The Day-Ahead Market in Practice
_t-- The Real-Time Market in Practice
_t-- The New Unit-Commitment Problem
_t-- The Market for Operating Reserves
_t-- Part 4: Market Power
_t-- Defining Market Power
_t-- Exercising Market Power
_t-- Modeling Market Power
_t-- Designing to Reduce Market Power
_t-- Predicting Market Power
_t-- Monitoring Market Power
_t-- Part 5: Locational Pricing
_t-- Power Transmission and Losses
_t-- Physical Transmission Limits
_t-- Congestion Pricing Fundamentals
_t-- Congestion Pricing Methods
_t-- Congestion Pricing Fallacies
_t-- Refunds and Taxes
_t-- Pricing Losses on Lines
_t-- Pricing Losses at Nodes
_t-- Transmission Rights
_t-- Glossary
_t-- References
_t-- Index.
520 _a"The first systematic presentation of electricity market design-from the basics to the cutting edge. Unique in its breadth and depth. Using examples and focusing on fundamentals, it clarifies long misunderstood issues-such as why todays markets are inherently unstable. The book reveals for the first time how uncoordinated regulatory and engineering policies cause boom-bust investment swings and provides guidance and tools for fixing broken markets. It also takes a provocative look at the operation of pools and power exchanges. Part 1 introduces key economic, engineering and market design concepts. Part 2 links short-run reliability policies with long-run investment problems. Part 3 examines classic designs for day-ahead and real-time markets. Part 4 covers market power, and Part 5 covers locational pricing, transmission right and pricing losses. The non-technical introductions to all chapters allow easy access to the most difficult topics. Steering an independent course between ideological extremes, it provides background material for engineers, economists, regulators and lawyers alike. With nearly 250 figures, tables, side bars, and concisely-stated results and fallacies, the 44 chapters cover such essential topics as auctions, fixed-cost recovery from marginal cost, pricing fallacies, real and reactive power flows, Cournot competition, installed capacity markets, HHIs, the Lerner index and price caps. About the Author Steven Stoft has a Ph.D. in economics (U.C. Berkeley) as well as a background in physics, math, engineering, and astronomy. He spent a year inside FERC and now consults for PJM, California and private generators. Learn more at www.stoft.com." http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/wiley036/2002618019.html.
650 0 _aElectric utilities
_xEconomic aspects.
650 0 _aElectric industries
_xEconomic aspects.
650 0 _aElectric power
_9121812
650 0 _aElectric utilities.
942 _2lcc
_cKT
999 _c94165
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